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same has been true for various other sciences that were predicted to revolutionize the law, including 
behavioral psychology, sociology, psychodynamic psychology, and others. This will also be true of 
neuroscience, which is simply the newest science on the block. Neuroscience is not going to do the 
terrible things The Economist fears, at least not for the foreseeable future. Neuroscience has many things 
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the relation of scientific, causal accounts of behavior to responsibility. The following Part examines the 
limits of neurolaw and Part VII considers why neurolaw does not pose a genuinely radical challenge to the 
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contribution neuroscience may make to law in the near and intermediate term. A brief conclusion 
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Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw
Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty
by Stephen J. Morse*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2002 editorial published in The Economist, the following warning
was given: "Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make
society homogeneous and gut the concept of human nature. But
neuroscience could do all of these things first."' The genome was fully
sequenced in 2001, and there has not been one resulting major advance
in therapeutic medicine since. Thus, even in its most natural applied
domain-medicine-genetics has not had the far-reaching consequences
that were envisioned.2 The same has been true for various other
sciences that were predicted to revolutionize the law, including
behavioral psychology, sociology, psychodynamic psychology, and others.
This will also be true of neuroscience, which is simply the newest science
on the block. Neuroscience is not going to do the terrible things The
Economist fears, at least not for the foreseeable future. Neuroscience
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and Law
in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. Diplomate, American Board of Professional
Psychology (Forensic).
An earlier version of this Article was presented at a Symposium, "The Brain Sciences in
the Courtroom," held on October 22, 2010, at the Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law. I thank the organizers, Professor Ted Blumoff, and the members of the
Mercer Law Review. Jakob Elster made especially helpful suggestions. As always, I thank
my personal attorney, Jean Avnet Morse, for her sound, sober counsel and moral support.
1. The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, ECONOMIST, May 23, 2002, at 77,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/1143317/print.
2. See, e.g., Robert Koenig, Genome Scans: Impatient for the Payoff, 342 SCIENCE 448
(2009); Nicholas Wade, Genes Show Limited Value in Predicting Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2009, at Al.
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has many things to say but not nearly as much as people would hope,
especially in relation to law. At most, in the near to intermediate term,
neuroscience may make modest contributions to legal policy and case
adjudication. Nonetheless, there has been irrational exuberance about
the potential contribution of neuroscience, an issue I have addressed
previously and referred to as "Brain Overclaim Syndrome."3
I first consider the law's motivation and the motivation of some
advocates to turn to science to solve the very hard normative problems
that law addresses. Part III discusses the law's psychology and its
concepts of the person and responsibility. The next Part considers the
general relation of neuroscience to law, which I characterize as the issue
of "translation." Part V canvasses various distractions that have
bedeviled clear thinking about the relation of scientific, causal accounts
of behavior to responsibility. The following Part examines the limits of
neurolaw and Part VII considers why neurolaw does not pose a
genuinely radical challenge to the law's concepts of the person and
responsibility. Part VIII makes a case for cautious optimism about the
contribution neuroscience may make to law in the near and intermediate
term. A brief conclusion follows.
II. SCIENCE AND LAW
Everyone understands that legal issues are normative, addressing how
we should regulate our lives in a complex society. How do we live
together? What are the duties we owe each other? For violation of those
duties, when is the state justified in imposing the most afflictive-but
sometimes justified-exercises of state power, criminal blame, and
punishment?' When should we do this, to whom, and how much?
Virtually every legal issue is contested-consider criminal responsibili-
ty, for example-and there is always room for debate about policy,
doctrine, and adjudication. In a recent book, Professor Robin Feldman
has argued that law lacks the courage forthrightly to address the
difficult normative issues that it faces.' The law therefore adopts what
Feldman terms an "internalizing" and an "externalizing" strategy for
using science to try to avoid the difficulties. In the internalizing
strategy, the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria. A futuristic
example might be using neural criteria for criminal responsibility. In
3. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006).
4. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that criminal blame and
punishment are such severe infringements that due process requires that conviction must
be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the crime).
5. See generally ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009).
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the externalizing strategy, the law turns to scientific or clinical experts
to make the decision. An example would be using forensic clinicians to
decide whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial and
then simply rubberstamping the clinicians' opinion. Neither strategy is
successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and impedes
legal evolution and progress. Professor Feldman concludes, and I agree,
that the law does not err by using science too little, as is commonly
claimed. Rather, it errs by using it too much because the law is too
insecure about its resources and capacities to do justice.
A fascinating question is why so many enthusiasts seem to have
extravagant expectations about the contribution of neuroscience to law,
especially criminal law. Here is my speculation about the source. Many
people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive justice,
thinking that they are prescientific and harsh. Their hope is that the
new neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true,
no offender is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is
that the law should adopt a consequentially-based prediction/prevention
system of social control guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-
kings who will finally have supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.
On a more modest level, many advocates think that neuroscience may
not revolutionize criminal justice, but neuroscience will demonstrate that
many more offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh
punishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system.
Four decades ago, our criminal justice system would have been using
psychodynamic psychology for the same purpose. More recently, genetics
has been employed in a similar manner. The impulse, however, is clear:
jettison desert, or at least mitigate judgments of desert. As will be
shown in Parts V and VII, however, these advocates often adopt an
untenable theory of mitigation or excuse that quickly collapses into the
nihilistic conclusion that no one is really criminally responsible.
III. THE LAW'S PSYCHOLOGY, CONCEPT OF THE PERSON, AND
RESPONSIBILITY
Criminal law presupposes a "folk-psychological" view of the person and
behavior. This psychological theory explains behavior in part by mental
states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans. Biological
and other psychological and sociological variables also play a causal role,
but folk psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full causal
6. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 207, 217-18, 224 (Samir Zeki & Oliver
Goodenough eds., 2006).
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explanation and understanding of human action. Lawyers, philosophers,
and scientists argue about the definitions of mental states and theories
of action, but that does not undermine the general claim that mental
states are fundamental. Indeed, the arguments and evidence disputants
use to convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the
person. Brains do not convince each other; people do. Folk psychology
presupposes only that human action will at least be rationalizable by
mental state explanations or will be responsive to reasons-including
incentives-under the right conditions.
For example, the folk-psychological explanation for why you are
reading this Article is, roughly, that you desire to understand the
relation of neuroscience to criminal responsibility or to law generally.
You believe that reading the Article will help fulfill that desire so you
formed the intention to read it. This is a practical, rather than a
deductive, syllogism.
Brief reflection should indicate that the law's psychology must be a
folk-psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious-and
potentially self-conscious-creature who forms and acts on intentions that
are the product of the person's other mental states. We are the sort of
creatures who can act for and respond to reason. The law treats persons
generally as intentional creatures and not simply as mechanistic forces
of nature.
Law is primarily action-guiding and could not guide people directly
and indirectly unless people could use rules as premises in their
reasoning about how they should behave. Otherwise, law as an action-
guiding system of rules would be useless (and perhaps incoherent).
Legal rules are action-guiding primarily because these rules provide an
agent with good moral or prudential reasons for forbearance or action.
Human behavior can be modified by means other than influencing
deliberation, and human beings do not always deliberate before they act.
Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology even when we most
habitually follow the legal rules. Unless people are capable of under-
standing and then using legal rules to guide their conduct, the law is
powerless to affect human behavior.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people must always
reason or consistently behave rationally according to some pre-ordained,
normative notion of rationality. Rather, the law's view is that people are
capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality
according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards.
The type of rationality the law requires is the ordinary person's common
sense view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be
acceptable within the disciplines of economics, philosophy, psychology,
computer science, and the like.
[Vol. 62840
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Virtually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed,
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation and, in
principle, is responsive to reason, including incentives. Machines may
cause harm, but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate
expectations about how people ought to live together. Machines do not
deserve praise, blame, reward, punishment, concern, or respect because
they exist or because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional
agents with the potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations
of what they owe each other.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action might
consider folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientific view of human
behavior. For the foreseeable future, however, the law will be based on
the folk-psychological model of the person and behavior described. Until
and unless scientific discoveries convince us that our view of ourselves
is radically wrong, the basic explanatory apparatus of folk psychology
will remain central. It is vital that we not lose sight of this model lest
we fall into confusion when various claims based on neuroscience are
made. If any science is to have appropriate influence on current law and
legal decision-making, the science must be relevant to and translated
into the law's folk-psychological framework (as shall be discussed in
more detail in Part IV, below).
All of the law's doctrinal criteria for criminal responsibility are folk-
psychological. Begin with the definitional criteria, the "elements" of
crime. The "voluntary" act requirement is defined, roughly, as an
intentional bodily movement-or omission in cases in which the person
has a duty to act-done in a reasonably integrated state of consciousness.
Other than crimes of strict liability, all crimes also require a culpable
mental state, such as purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. All affirma-
tive defenses of justification and excuse involve an inquiry into the
person's mental state, such as the belief that self-defensive force was
necessary or the lack of knowledge of right from wrong.
Our folk-psychological concepts of criminal responsibility follow
logically from the action-guiding nature of law itself, from its folk-
psychological concept of the person and action, and from the aim of
achieving retributive justice, which holds that no one should be punished
unless they deserve it and no more than they deserve. The general
capacity for rationality is the primary condition for responsibility, and
the lack of that capacity is the primary condition for excusing a person.
If human beings were not rational creatures who could understand the
good reasons for action and were not capable of conforming to legal
requirements through intentional action or forbearance, the law could
not adequately guide action and would not be just. Legally responsible
agents are therefore people who have the general capacity to grasp and
841
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be guided by good reason in particular legal contexts.' In cases of
excuse, the agent who has done something wrong acts for a reason, but
is either incapable of rationality generally or incapable on the specific
occasion in question. This explains, for example, why young children
and some people with mental disorders are not held responsible. The
amount of lack of the capacity for rationality that is necessary to find
the agent not responsible is a moral, social, political, and, ultimately,
legal issue. It is not a scientific, medical, psychological, or psychiatric
issue.
Compulsion or coercion is also an excusing condition. Literal compul-
sion exists when the person's bodily movement is a pure mechanism that
is not rationalizable by the agent's desires, beliefs, and intentions.
These cases defeat the requirement of a "voluntary act." For example,
a tremor or spasm produced by a neurological disorder is not an action
because it is not intentional and, therefore, defeats the ascription of a
voluntary act. Metaphorical compulsion exists when an agent acts
intentionally but in response to some hard choice imposed on the agent
through no fault of his or her own. For example, if a miscreant holds a
gun to an agent's head and threatens to kill her unless she kills another
innocent person, it would be wrong to kill under these circumstances.
Nevertheless, the law may decide as a normative matter to excuse the
act of intentional killing because the agent was motivated by a threat so
great that it would be supremely difficult for most citizens to resist.
Cases involving internal compulsive states are more difficult to
conceptualize because it is difficult to define and to assess "loss of
control." The cases that most fit this category are "disorders of desire,"
such as addictions and sexual disorders. The question is why these
acting agents lack control, but other people with strong desires do not.
If people frequently yield to their apparently very strong desires at great
social, occupational, or legal cost to themselves, agents will often say
they could not help themselves, they were not in control, and an excuse
or mitigation was therefore warranted. But why mitigation or excuse
should obtain is difficult to understand.
7. I adapt the felicitous phrase "to grasp and be guided by good reason" from Jay
Wallace. R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBLITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 86 (1994).
8. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025,
1035 (2002).
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IV LOST IN TRANSLATION?
LEGAL RELEVANCE AND THE NEED FOR TRANSLATION
What in principle is the possible relation of neuroscience to law? We
must begin with a distinction between internal relevance and external
relevance. An internal contribution or critique accepts the general
coherence and legitimacy of a set of legal doctrines, practices, or
institutions and attempts to explain or alter them. For example, an
internal contribution to criminal responsibility may suggest the need for
doctrinal reform of, say, the insanity defense, but it would not suggest
that the notion of criminal responsibility is itself incoherent or illegiti-
mate. By contrast, an externally relevant critique suggests that the
doctrines, practices, or institutions are incoherent, illegitimate, or
unjustified. Because a radical, external critique has little possibility of
success at present (as is explained in Part VII), this Part makes the
simplifying assumption that the contributions of neuroscience will be
internal and thus will need to be translated into the law's folk-psycholog-
ical concepts.
The law's criteria for responsibility and competence are essentially
behavioral-acts and mental states. The concepts and data of neuro-
science are mechanistic-neural structure and function. Is the apparent
chasm between those two types of discourse bridgeable? This is a
familiar question in the field of mental health law,' but there is even
greater dissonance in neurolaw. Psychiatry and psychology sometimes
treat behavior mechanistically, sometimes treat it folk-psychologically,
and sometimes blend the two. In many cases, the psychological sciences
are quite close to folk psychology in approach. Neuroscience, in contrast,
is purely mechanistic and eschews folk-psychological concepts and
discourse. Thus, the gap will be harder to bridge.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how this
occurs). Therefore, facts we learn about brains in general or about a
specific brain in principle could provide useful information about mental
states and about human capacities in general and in specific cases.
Some believe that this conclusion is a category error.10 This is a
plausible view, and perhaps it is correct. If it is, then the whole subject
of neurolaw is empty, and there was no point to writing this Article in
the first place. Let us therefore bracket this pessimistic view and
9. See, e.g., ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 95-96 (1984).
10. See, e.g., M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEUROSCIENCE 112, 270, 360, 381 (2003); Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson,
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211.
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determine what follows from the more optimistic position that what we
learn about the brain and nervous system can be potentially helpful to
resolving questions of criminal responsibility if the findings are properly
translated into the law's psychological framework.
The question is whether the new neuroscience is legally relevant
because it makes a proposition about responsibility or competence more
or less likely to be true. Any legal criterion must be established
independently, and biological evidence must be translated into the
criminal law's folk-psychological criteria. That is, the expert must be
able to explain precisely how the neuroevidence bears on whether the
agent acted, formed a required mens rea, or met the criteria for an
excusing condition. If the evidence is not directly relevant, the expert
should be able to explain the chain of inference from the indirect
evidence to the law's criteria. At present, as Part VI explains, few such
data exist, but neuroscience is advancing so rapidly that such data may
exist in the near or medium term. Moreover, the argument is conceptual
and does not depend on any particular neuroscience findings.
V. DANGEROUS DISTRACTIONS CONCERNING NEUROSCIENCE AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPETENCE
This Part considers a number of related issues that are often thought
to be relevant to criminal responsibility and competence, but that are
irrelevant, confusing, and distracting: free will, causation as an excuse,
causation as compulsion, prediction as an excuse, dualism, and the
nonefficacy of mental states. Much of the legal exuberance about the
contributions of neurolaw flow from these confusions and distractions so
it is important to correct them. The legal exuberance also flows,
however, from unrealistic expectations about the scientific accomplish-
ments of neuroscience. Part VI of this Article addresses the scientific
exuberance.
Contrary to what many people believe and what judges and others
sometimes say, free will is not a legal criterion that is part of any
doctrine, and it is not even foundational for criminal responsibility.u
Criminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of determin-
ism or universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations of
responsibility. Even if determinism is true, some people act and some
people do not. Some people form prohibited mental states and some do
not. Some people are legally insane or act under duress when they
commit crimes, but most defendants are not legally insane or acting
11. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and
Psychology, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 203, 204 (2007).
[Vol. 62844
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under duress. Moreover, these distinctions matter to moral and legal
theories of responsibility and fairness that we have reason to endorse.
Thus, law addresses problems genuinely related to responsibility,
including consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention
and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and compulsion. The law,
however, never addresses the presence or absence of free will.
When most people use the term free will in the context of legal
responsibility, they are typically using this term loosely as a synonym
for the conclusion the defendant was or was not criminally responsible.
They typically have reached this conclusion for reasons that do not
involve free will-for example, that the defendant was legally insane or
acted under duress-but such usage of free will only perpetuates
misunderstanding and confusion. Once the legal criteria for excuse have
been met-and no excuse includes lack of free will as a criterion-the
defendant will be excused without any reference whatsoever to free will
as an independent ground for excuse.
There is a genuine metaphysical problem about free will, which is
whether human beings have the capacity to act uncaused by anything
other than themselves and whether this capacity is a necessary
foundation for holding anyone legally or morally accountable for criminal
conduct. Philosophers and others have debated these issues in various
forms for millennia and there is no resolution in sight. Indeed, some
people might think the problem is not resolvable. This is a philosophical
issue, but it is not a problem for the law, and neuroscience raises no new
challenge to this conclusion. Solving the free will problem would have
profound implications for responsibility doctrines and practices, such as
blame and punishment, but having or lacking libertarian freedom is not
a criterion of any civil or criminal law doctrine.
Neuroscience is simply the most recent mechanistic causal science that
appears deterministically to explain behavior. Neuroscience thus joins
social structural variables, behaviorism, genetics, and other scientific
explanations that have also been deterministic explanations for behavior.
In principle, however, neuroscience adds nothing new, even if neurosci-
ence is a better, more persuasive science than some of its predecessors.
No science, including neuroscience, can demonstrate that libertarian free
will does or does not exist. As long as free will in the strong sense is not
foundational for just blame and punishment and is not a criterion at the
doctrinal level-which it is not-the truth of determinism or universal
causation poses no threat to legal responsibility. Neuroscience may help
shed light on folk-psychological excusing conditions, such as automatism
or legal insanity, but the truth of determinism is not an excusing
condition. The law will be fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience
or any other science can conclusively demonstrate that the law's
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psychology is wrong, and that we are not the type of creatures for whom
mental states are causally effective. This is a different question from
whether determinism undermines responsibility, however, and this
Article returns to it below.
A related confusion is that behavior is excused if it is caused, but
causation per se is not a legal or moral mitigating or excusing condition.
I termed this confusion the "fundamental psycholegal error."12 At most,
causal explanations can only provide evidence concerning whether a
genuine excusing condition, such as lack of rational capacity, was
present. For example, suppose a life marked by poverty and abuse
played a predisposing causal role in a defendant's criminal behavior or
that an alleged new mental syndrome played a causal role in explaining
criminal conduct. The claim is often made that such causes-which are
not within the actor's capacity to control rationally-should be an
excusing or mitigating position per se, but this claim is false.
All behavior is the product of the necessary and sufficient causal
conditions without which the behavior would not have occurred,
including brain causation, which is always part of the causal explanation
for any behavior. If causation were an excusing condition per se, then
no one would be responsible for any behavior. Some people might
welcome such a conclusion and believe that responsibility is impossible,
but this is not the legal and moral world we inhabit. The law holds
most adults responsible for most of their conduct, and genuine excusing
conditions are limited. Thus, unless the person's history or mental
condition, for example, provides evidence of an existing excusing or
mitigating condition, such as lack of rational capacity, there is no reason
for excuse or mitigation.
Even a genuinely abnormal cause is not an excusing condition. For
example, imagine a person with paranoid suspiciousness who constantly
and hyper-vigilantly scans his environment for cues of an impending
threat. Suppose our person with paranoia now spots a genuine threat
that no normal person would have recognized and responds with
proportionate defensive force. The paranoia played a causal role in
explaining the behavior, but no excusing condition occurred. Indeed, the
paranoid agent was "hyper-rational" for these purposes and would be
justified. If the paranoia produced a delusional belief that an attack was
imminent, then a genuine excuse, legal insanity-an irrationality-based
defense-might be appropriate.
In short, a neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal conduct, like
any other type of causal explanation, does not per se mitigate or excuse.
12. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1592-94 (1994).
[Vol. 62846
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It only provides evidence that might help the law resolve whether a
genuine excuse existed, or it may in the future provide data that might
be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures.
Compulsion is a genuine mitigating or excusing condition, but
causation-including brain causation-is not the equivalent of compulsion.
As we have seen, compulsion may be either literal or metaphorical and
normative. It is crucial to recognize that most human action is not
plausibly the result of either type of compulsion, but all human behavior
is caused by its necessary and sufficient causes-including brain
causation. Even abnormal causes are not necessarily compelling. To
illustrate, suppose that a person has weak pedophilic urges and weak
sexual urges in general. If this person molested a child there would be
no ground for a compulsion excuse. If causation were the equivalent of
compulsion, all behavior would be compelled and no one would be
responsible. Once again, this is not a plausible account of the law's
responsibility conditions. Causal information from neuroscience might
help us resolve questions concerning whether legal compulsion existed,
or it might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative measures when
dealing with plausible legal compulsion. Causation, however, is not per
se compulsion.
Causal knowledge, whether from neuroscience or any other science,
can enhance the accuracy of behavioral predictions, but predictability is
also not a per se excusing or mitigating condition-even if the predict-
ability of the behavior is perfect. To understand this, consider how
many things we do that are perfectly predictable for which there is no
plausible excusing or mitigating condition. Even if the explanatory
variables that enhance prediction are abnormal, excuse or mitigation is
warranted only if a genuine excusing or mitigating condition is present.
For example, recent research demonstrates that a history of childhood
abuse coupled with a specific, genetically-produced enzyme abnormality
that produces a neurotransmitter deficit vastly increase the risk that a
person will behave antisocially as an adolescent or young adult. A
person is nine times more at risk if he has the monoamine oxidase A
(MAOA) deficiency and a childhood abuse history." Does this mean
that an offender with this gene by environment interaction, is not
responsible or less responsible? No. The offender may not be fully
responsible or responsible at all, but not because there is a causal
explanation. What is the intermediary excusing or mitigating principle?
Are these people, for instance, more impulsive? Are they lacking
13. See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in
Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002); Theodore Y. Blumoff, Foreword: The Brain
Sciences and Criminal Law Norms, 62 MERCER L. REV. 705, 740-43 (2011).
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rationality? What is the actual excusing or mitigating condition? Again,
causation is not compulsion, and predictability is not an excuse. Just
because an offender is caused to do something or is predictable does not
mean the offender is compelled to do the crime charged or is otherwise
not responsible. Brain causation-or any other kind of causation-does
not mean we are automatons, not really acting agents at all, or
otherwise excused.
Causal information may be of prophylactic or rehabilitative use for
people affected, but no excuse or mitigation is applicable just because
these variables make antisocial behavior far more predictable. If the
variables that enhance prediction also produce a genuine excusing or
mitigating condition, then excuse or mitigation is justified for the latter
reason and independent of the prediction.
Most informed people are not "dualists" about the relation between the
mind and the brain. That is, they no longer think that the mind-or
soul-is independent of the brain and body and can somehow exert a
causal influence over the body. It may seem as if law's emphasis on the
importance of mental states as causing behavior is based on a prescien-
tific, outmoded form of dualism, but this is not the case. Although the
brain enables the mind, we have no idea how this occurs and have no
idea how action is possible. It is clear that, at the least, mental states
are dependent upon or supervene on brain states, but neither neurosci-
ence nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states do not
play an independent and partial causal role.
Despite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action relation,
some scientists and philosophers question whether mental states have
any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic appendixes that
evolution has created but that have no genuine function. These claims
are not strawpersons. They are made by serious, thoughtful people."
As discussed in Part VII below, if accepted, they would create a complete
and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility
and competence (and more widely). Thus, this claim is an external
critique and must be understood as such. Moreover, given our current
state of knowledge, there is little scientific or conceptual reason to accept
it.15
In conclusion, legal actors concerned with criminal law policy, doctrine,
and adjudication must always keep the folk-psychological view present
in their minds when considering claims or evidence from neuroscience
and must always question how the science is legally relevant to the law's
14. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 6, at 217-18.
15. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in LAw
AND NEUROSCIENCE 529, 543-54 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
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action and mental states criteria. The truth of determinism, causation,
and predictability do not in themselves answer any doctrinal or policy
issue.
VI. THE LIMITS OF NEUROSCIENCE FOR LAW
Most generally, the relation between brain, mind, and action is one of
the hardest problems in all of science. We have no idea how the brain
enables the mind or how action is possible."6 The brain-mind-action
relation is a mystery. For example, we would like to know the difference
between a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving one's arm in
exactly the same way. The former is a purely mechanical motion,
whereas the latter is an action, but we cannot explain the difference
between the two. We know that a functioning brain is a necessary
condition for having mental states and for acting. After all, if your brain
is dead, you have no mental states, are not acting, and indeed are not
doing much of anything at all. Still, we do not know how mental states
and action are caused.
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other
neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal
knowledge of how the brain works generally and we have little
information that is legally relevant. This is unsurprising. The scientific
problems are fearsomely difficult. Only in the last decade have
researchers begun to accumulate much data from functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), which is the technology that has generated
most of the legal interest. Moreover, virtually no studies have been
performed to address specifically legal questions.
Before turning to the specific reasons for neuromodesty, a few
preliminary points of general applicability must be addressed. The first
and most important is contained in the message of the prior Part.
Causation by biological variables, including abnormal biological
variables, does not per se create an excusing or mitigating condition.
Any excusing condition must be established independently. The goal is
always to translate the biological evidence into the criminal law's folk-
psychological criteria.
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective evaluation
of the defendant's mental states at the time of the crime. No criminal
wears a portable scanner or other neurodetection device that provides a
measurement at the time of the crime, at least not yet. Further,
neuroscience is insufficiently developed to detect specific, legally relevant
16. PAuL R. MCHUGH & PHLLIP R. SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 11-12
(2d ed. 1998).
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mental content or to provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for
even a severe mental disorder." Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural
structure and function that bear on legally relevant capacities, such as
the capacity for rationality and control, may be temporally stable in
general or in individual cases. If they are, neuroevidence may permit a
reasonably valid retrospective inference about the defendant's rational
and control capacities and their impact on criminal behavior. This will
of course depend on the existence of adequate science to do this. We now
lack such science, but future research may remedy this.
Questions concerning competence or predictions of future behavior are
based on a subject's present condition. Thus, the problems besetting the
retrospective responsibility analysis do not apply to such questions. The
criteria for competence are functional. They ask whether the subject can
perform some task, such as understanding the nature of a criminal
proceeding or understanding a treatment option that is offered, at a level
the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the
subject's choice and autonomy.
Now, let us begin consideration of the specific grounds for neuro-
modesty. At present, most neuroscience studies on human beings
involve very small numbers of subjects, which makes establishing
statistical significance difficult. Most of the studies have been done on
college and university students, who are hardly a random sample of the
population generally and of criminal offenders specifically. There is also
a serious question of whether findings based on subjects' behavior and
brain activity in a scanner would apply to real world situations.
Further, most studies average the neurodata over the subjects, and the
average finding may not accurately describe the brain structure or
function of any actual subject in the study. Replications are few, which
is especially important for law. Policy and adjudication should not be
influenced by findings that are insuffiently established, and replications
of findings are crucial to our confidence in a result. Finally, the
neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behavior is largely in its
infancy and what is known is quite coarse-grained and correlational,
17. Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIr. J. PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2009). Many
studies do find differences between patients with mental disorders and controls, but the
differences are too small to be used diagnostically. But see generally John P.A. loannidis,
Excess Significance Bias in the Literature on Brain Volume Abnormalities, ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY, http://archpsyc.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/archgenpsychiatry.2001.28v1.pdf
(claiming, based on a meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients
with mental disorders, that many more studies than should be expected found statistically
significant results and that this can be best explained by bias in the reporting of the data).
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rather than fine-grained and causal." What is being investigated is an
association between a task in the scanner and brain activity. These
studies do not demonstrate that the brain activity is either a necessary,
sufficient, or predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task that
is being done in the scanner. Any language that suggests otherwise,
such as claiming that some brain region is the neural substrate for the
behavior, is simply not justifiable. Moreover, activity in the same region
may be associated with diametrically opposed behavioral phenomena,
such as love and hate.
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It takes
many mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI data to
the images of the brain that are increasingly familiar. Explaining these
transformations is beyond me, but I do understand that the likelihood
that an investigator will find a statistically significant result depends on
how the researcher sets the threshold for significance. There is dispute
about this, and the threshold levels are conventional. If the threshold
changes, so does the outcome. I have been convinced by neuroscience
colleagues that many such technical difficulties have been largely solved,
but research design and potentially unjustified inferences from the
studies are still an acute problem." It is extraordinarily difficult to
control all conceivable artifacts. Consequently, there are often problems
of over-inference. Finally, it is also an open question whether accurate
inferences or predictions about individuals are possible using group data
when that group includes the individual. This is a very controversial
topic, but even if it is difficult-or impossible-now, it may become easier
in the future. Over time, however, these problems may ease as imaging
and other techniques become less expensive and more accurate, research
designs become more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the science
increases generally.
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the law
involve some behavior that has already been identified as of interest,
and the point of the study is to identify that behavior's neural correlates.
Neuroscientists do not go on general "fishing" expeditions. There is
usually some bit of behavior, such as addiction, schizophrenia, or
impulsivity, that investigators would like to understand better by
investigating its neural correlates. To do this properly presupposes that
18. See, e.g., Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the Brain, 5
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 716 (2010) (providing a cautious, thorough overview of the scientific
and practical problems facing cognitive and social neuroscience).
19. Professor Amanda Pustilnik's contribution to this Symposium also notes the reverse
inference problem in the context of pain identification. See, e.g., The Brain Sciences in the
Courtroom, A Symposium of the Mercer Law Review, 62 MERCER L. REv. 769, 819 (2011).
851
MERCER LAW REVIEW
the researchers have already identified and validated the behavior under
neuroscientific investigation.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior is not
well-characterized or is neurally indistinguishable from other, seemingly
different behavior. In general, however, the existence of legally relevant
behavior will already be apparent. For example, some people are grossly
out of touch with reality. If, as a result, they do not understand right
from wrong, we excuse them because they lack such knowledge. We
might learn a great deal about the neural correlates of such psychologi-
cal abnormalities, but we already knew without neuroscientic data that
these abnormalities existed, and we had a firm view of their normative
significance. In the future, however, we may learn more about the
causal link between the brain and behavior, and studies may be devised
that are more directly legally relevant. I suspect that we are unlikely
to make substantial progress with neural assessment of legally relevant
mental content, but we are likely to learn more about capacities that will
bear on excuse or mitigation.
The criteria for both responsibility and competence are behavioral;
therefore, actions speak louder than images. This is a truism for all
criminal responsibility and competence assessments. If the finding of
any test or measurement of behavior is contradicted by actual behavioral
evidence, then we must believe the behavioral evidence because it is
more direct and probative of the law's behavioral criteria. For example,
if the person behaves rationally in a wide variety of circumstances, the
agent is rational even if the brain appears structurally or functionally
abnormal. We confidently knew that some people were behaviorally
abnormal, such as being psychotic, long before there were any psycholog-
ical or neurological tests for such abnormalities.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive. Suppose
someone complains about back pain, a subjective symptom, and the
question is whether the subject actually does have back pain. We know
that many people with abnormal spines do not experience back pain, and
many people who complain of back pain have normal spines. If the
person is claiming a disability and the spine looks dreadful, evidence
that the person regularly exercises on a trampoline without difficulty
indicates that there is no disability caused by back pain. If there is
reason to suspect malingering, however, and there is not clear behavioral
evidence of lack of pain, then a completely normal spine might be of use
in deciding whether the claimant is malingering. Unless the correlation
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between the image and the legally relevant behavior is very powerful,
however, such evidence will be of limited help.20
If actions speak louder than images, however, what room is there for
using neuroevidence? Let us begin with cases in which the behavioral
evidence is clear and permits an equally clear inference about the
defendant's mental state. For example, lay people may not know the
technical term to apply to people who are manifestly out of touch with
reality, but they will readily recognize this unfortunate condition. No
further tests of any sort will be necessary to prove this. In such cases,
neuroevidence will be at most convergent and increase our confidence in
what we already had confidently concluded. Determining if it is worth
collecting the neuroevidence will depend on whether the cost-benefit
analysis justifies obtaining convergent evidence.
The most striking example of this type of case was Roper v. Sim-
mons.21 In Roper, the Supreme Court categorically excluded the death
penalty for capital murderers who killed when they were sixteen or
seventeen years old on the ground that adolescents do not deserve the
death penalty.22 The amicus briefs were replete with neuroscience data
showing that the brains of late adolescents are not fully biologically
mature, and advocates used this data to suggest that adolescent killers
could not be fairly put to death." Now, we already knew from common
sense observation and from rigorous behavioral studies the Court cited
that juveniles are on average less rational than adults. What did the
neuroscientific evidence about the juvenile brain add? It was consistent
with the undeniable behavioral data and perhaps provided a partial
causal explanation of the behavioral differences. The neuroscience data
was therefore merely additive and only indirectly relevant to the
behavioral criteria for responsibility, and the Supreme Court did not cite
it, except perhaps by implication.2'
20. Once again, Professor Pustilnik addresses the same issue. She concludes that
although investigators are making progress in identifying neural correlates of pain,
imaging data are not yet sufficiently diagnostic to reach firm conclusions about whether
a subject is actually in pain. Pustilnik, supra note 19, at 822-25.
21. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22. Id. at 578-79.
23. Id. at 569.
24. See id. at 569, 573. The Supreme Court did refer generally to other science, but it
was not clear if neuroscience played a specific role. See id. The Supreme Court did cite
neuroscientific findings in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), which categorically
excluded juveniles from life without the possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes. Id.
at 2034. The citation was general, and I believe it was dictum. The Supreme Court was
responding to an argument that no party had seriously made, which was that the science
of adolescent development had changed significantly since Roper was decided. Id. at 2026-
27.
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Whether adolescents are sufficiently less rational on average than
adults to exclude them categorically from the death penalty is of course
a normative legal question and not a scientific or psychological question.
Advocates claimed, however, that the neuroscience confirmed that
adolescents are insufficiently responsible to be executed,2 5 thus
confusing the positive and the normative. The neuroscience evidence in
no way independently confirms that adolescents are less responsible. If
the behavioral differences between adolescents and adults were slight,
it would not matter if their brains were quite different. Similarly, if the
behavioral differences were sufficient for moral and constitutional
differential treatment, then it would not matter if the brains were
essentially indistinguishable.
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential contribution of
neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in just such cases that the
neuroscience at present is not likely to be of much help. I term this the
"clear cut" problem.26 Recall that neuroscientific studies usually start
with clear cases of well-characterized behavior. In such cases, the
neural markers might be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified
behaviors precisely because the behavior is so clear. Less clear behavior
is simply not studied, or the overlap in data about less clear behavior is
greater between experimental and control subjects. Thus, the neural
markers of clear cases will provide little guidance to resolve behaviorally
ambiguous cases of legally relevant behavior.
For example, suppose in an insanity defense case the question is
whether the defendant suffers from a major mental disorder, such as
schizophrenia. In extreme cases, the behavior will be clear, and no
neurodata will be necessary. Investigators have discovered various
small-but statistically significant-differences in neural structure or
function between people who are clearly suffering from schizophrenia
and those who are not.27 Nonetheless, in a behaviorally unclear case,
the overlap between data on the brains of people with schizophrenia and
people without the disorder is so great that a scan is insufficiently
sensitive to be used for diagnostic purposes.
Some people think that executive capacity-the congeries of cognitive
and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human
behavior-is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an
offender's true culpability. After all, there is an attractive moral case
that people with a substantial lack of these capacities are less culpable,
25. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
26. Morse, supra note 15, at 540.
27. On the other hand, there may be reason to be cautious about such findings. See
generally, loannidis, supra note 17.
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even if their conduct satisfied the prima facie case for the crime charged.
Perhaps neuroscience can provide specific data previously unavailable
to identify executive capacity differences more precisely.
There are two problems, however. First, significant problems with
executive capacity are readily apparent without testing, and criminal
law simply will not adopt fine-grained culpability criteria. Second, the
correlation between neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and
actual real world behavior is not terribly high." Only a small fraction
of the variance is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the
types of tasks the tests use. Consequently, we are far from able to use
neuroscience accurately to assess non-obvious executive capacity
differences that are valid in real-world contexts.
VII. ASSESSING THE RADICAL CLAIM THAT WE ARE NOT AGENTS
This Part addresses the claim and hope alluded to earlier that
neuroscience will cause a paradigm shift in criminal responsibility by
demonstrating that we are "merely victims of neuronal circumstances"
(or some similar claim that denies human agency). This claim holds that
we are not the kinds of intentional creatures we think we are.
If our mental states play no role in our behavior and are simply
epiphenomenal, then traditional notions of responsibility based on
mental states and on actions guided by mental states would be
imperiled. But is the rich explanatory apparatus of intentionality simply
a post hoc rationalization that the brains of hapless homo sapiens
construct to explain what their brains have already done? Will the
criminal justice system as we know it wither away as an outmoded relic
of a prescientific and cruel age? If so, criminal law is not the only area
of law in peril. What will be the fate of contracts, for example, when a
biological machine that was formerly called a person claims that it
should not be bound because it did not make a contract? The contract
is also simply the outcome of various "neuronal circumstances."
Given how little we know about the brain-mind and brain-action
connections, to claim that we should radically change our picture of
ourselves, legal doctrines, and practices based on neuroscience is a form
of neuroarrogance. Although I predict that we will see far more
numerous attempts to introduce neuroevidence in the future, I have
elsewhere argued that for conceptual and scientific reasons there is no
28. See, e.g., Russell A. Barkley & Kevin R. Murphy, Impairment in Occupational
Functioning and Adult ADHD: The Predictive Utility of Executive Function (EF) Ratings
Versus EF Tests, 25 ARCHMVS CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 157 (2010).
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reason at present to believe that we are not agents." It is possible that
we are not agents, but the current science does not remotely demon-
strate that this is true. The burden of persuasion is firmly on the
proponents of the radical view.
What is more, the radical view entails no positive agenda. Suppose we
were convinced by the mechanistic view that we are not intentional,
rational agents after all.o What should we do now? We know that it
is an illusion to think that our deliberations and intentions have any
causal efficacy in the world. We also know, however, that we experience
sensations, such as pleasure and pain, and care about what happens to
us and to the world. We cannot just sit quietly and wait for our brains
to activate, for determinism to happen. We must, and will, deliberate
and act.
Even if we still thought that the radical view was correct and standard
notions of genuine moral responsibility and desert were therefore
impossible, we might still believe that the law would not necessarily
have to give up the concept of incentives. Indeed, Greene and Cohen
concede that we would have to keep punishing people for practical
purposes." Such an account would be consistent with "black box"
accounts of economic incentives that simply depend on the relation
between inputs and outputs without considering the mind as a mediator
between the two. For those who believe that a thoroughly naturalized
account of human behavior entails complete consequentialism, this
conclusion might be welcomed.
On the other hand, this view seems to entail the same internal
contradiction just explored. What is the nature of the agent that is
discovering the laws governing how incentives shape behavior? Could
understanding and providing incentives via social norms and legal rules
simply be epiphenomenal interpretations of what the brain has already
done? How do we decide which behaviors to reward or punish? What
role does reason-a property of thoughts and agents, not a property of
brains-play in this decision?
If the truth of pure mechanism is a premise in deciding what to do,
this premise yields no particular moral, legal, or political conclusions.32
29. Morse, supra note 15, at 543-54; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of
Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. &
TECH. 1, 19-34 (2008).
30. Of course, the notion of being "convinced" would be an illusion too. Being convinced
means that we are persuaded by evidence or argument, but a mechanism is not persuaded
by anything. A mechanism is simply neurophysically transformed.
31. Greene & Cohen, supra note 6, at 218.
32. I was first prompted to this line of thought by a suggestion Mitch Berman made in
the context of a discussion of determinism and normativity. Mitchell Berman, Punishment
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It will provide no guide to how one should live or to how one should
respond to the truth of reductive mechanism. Normativity depends on
reason and, thus, the radical view is normatively inert. If reasons do not
matter, then we have no reason to adopt any particular morals, politics,
or legal rules, or to do anything at all.
Given what we know and have reason to do, the allegedly disappear-
ing person remains fully visible and necessarily continues to act for good
reasons, including the reasons currently to reject the radical view. We
are not Pinocchios, and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the strings.
VIII. THE CASE FOR MODEST OPTIMISM
Despite having claimed that we should be exceptionally cautious about
the current contributions neuroscience can make to criminal law policy,
doctrine, and adjudication, I am modestly optimistic about the possibility
of near and intermediate term contributions neuroscience can make to
our ordinary, traditional, folk-psychological legal system. In other
words, neuroscience may make a positive contribution even though there
has been no paradigm shift in thinking about the nature of the person
and the criteria for criminal responsibility. The legal regime to which
neuroscience will contribute will continue to take people seriously as
people-as autonomous agents who may fairly be blamed and punished
based on their mental states and actions.
In general, the hope is that over time there will be feedback between
the folk-psychological criteria and the neuroscientific data. Each might
inform the other. Conceptual work on mental states might suggest new
neuroscientific studies, for example, and the neuroscientific studies
might help refine the folk-psychological categories. The ultimate goal
would be a reflective, conceptual-empirical equilibrium. More specifical-
ly, there are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of
assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk psychological assumption
underlying a legal rule is incorrect; (2) data suggesting the need for new
or reformed legal doctrine; (3) evidence that helps adjudicate an
individual case; and (4) data that help efficient adjudication or adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
Many criminal law doctrines are based on folk psychological assump-
tions about behavior that may prove to be incorrect. If so, the doctrine
should change. For example, it is commonly assumed that agents intend
the natural and probable consequences of their actions. In many or most
cases it seems that they do, but neuroscience may help in the future to
demonstrate that this assumption is true far less frequently than we
and Justification, 118 ETHiCS 258, 271 n.34 (2008).
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think. In that case, the rebuttable presumption used to help the
prosecution prove intent should be softened or used with more caution.
Second, neuroscientific data may suggest the need for new or reformed
legal doctrine. For example, control tests for legal insanity have been
disfavored for some decades because they are ill understood and hard to
assess. It is at present impossible to distinguish "can not" from "will
not." Perhaps neuroscientific information will help to demonstrate and
to assess the existence of control difficulties that are independent of
cognitive incapacities. If so, then perhaps control tests are justified and
can be rationally assessed after all. More generally, perhaps a
significant number of offenders have such grave rational or control
difficulties that they deserve a generic mitigation claim that is not
available in criminal law today. Neuroscience might help us discover
that fact. If that were true, justice would be served by adopting a
generic mitigating doctrine. On the other hand, if it turns out that such
difficulties are not so common, we could be more confident of the justice
of current doctrine.
Third, neuroscience might provide data to help adjudicate individual
cases. Consider the insanity defense again. As in United States v.
Hinckley," there is often dispute about whether a defendant claiming
legal insanity suffered from a mental disorder, which disorder the
defendant suffered from, and how severe the disorder was.' At
present, these questions must be resolved entirely behaviorally, and
there is often room for considerable disagreement about inferences
drawn from the defendant's actions, including utterances. In the future,
neuroscience might help resolve such questions if the clear cut problem
difficulty can be solved. As mentioned previously, however, in the
foreseeable future I doubt that neuroscience will be able to help identify
the presence or absence of specific mens reas.
Finally, neuroscience might help us to implement current policy more
efficiently. For example, the criminal justice system makes predictions
about future dangerous behavior for purposes of bail, sentencing,
including capital sentencing, and parole. If we have already decided
that it is justified to use dangerousness predictions to make such
decisions, it is hard to imagine a rational argument for doing it less
accurately if we were in fact able to do it more accurately. Behavioral
prediction techniques already exist. The question is whether
neuroscientific variables can add value by increasing the accuracy of
such predictions considering the cost of gathering such data. It is
33. 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981).
34. Id. at 1346.
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perfectly plausible that in the future they may do so, and thus,
prediction decisions will be more accurate and just.
IX. CONCLUSION
At present, neuroscience has little to contribute to more just and
accurate criminal law decision-making concerning policy, doctrine, and
individual case adjudication. This was the conclusion reached when I
tentatively identified "brain overclaim syndrome" five years ago, and it
remains true today. In the future, however, as the philosophies of mind
and action and neuroscience mutually mature and inform each other,
neuroscience will help us understand criminal behavior. Although no
radical transformation of criminal justice is likely to occur, neuroscience
can inform criminal justice as long as it is relevant to law and translated
into the law's folk-psychological framework and criteria.
